FEATURE ARTICLE

INFORMATION KIT

PARTIAL TEST-BAN TREATY—AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

"The early 1990s provide an opportunity for arms limitation and disarmament that we cannot afford to squander."

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
United Nations Secretary-General

Recent years have witnessed a significant improvement in the overall international political climate and in bilateral relations between a number of States in various regions of the world. The most profound changes have taken place in Europe, a continent where the two major nuclear Powers and their military alliances have confronted each other for decades. New political structures are emerging there and many long-standing differences are being resolved. Although tensions remain in some other parts of the world, several regional conflicts have been settled and efforts to resolve others peacefully are under way. The United Nations has played an important role in the process of conflict-resolution and peace-keeping, thereby making a significant contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, one of its main objectives.

These positive developments in the world, and in particular a marked improvement in East-West relations, create more favourable conditions for arms limitation and disarmament efforts. The task ahead remains, however, a complex one.

Although the shadow of the cold war is disappearing, the huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons—and their continued testing—remain a cause of deep and widespread concern in the international community. Most countries in the world consider that an early end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments would be an essential step towards preventing the qualitative improvement and the development of new nuclear weapons and would also contribute to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation.

The Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, which is to take place from 7 to 18 January 1991 at United Nations Headquarters, has been called to consider the proposed amendment to convert this Treaty, commonly referred to as the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT), into a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT).

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR TESTING

Nuclear weapons represent a form of weaponry which, by its multiple and far-reaching effects,

provides a means of warfare whose mass destructive potential is unparalleled in human experience. A single large nuclear weapon releases explosive power comparable to all the energy released from the conventional weapons used in all past wars.

To date there are five States that have officially acknowledged that they possess nuclear weapons: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

It is estimated that the current global total of nuclear warheads amounts to some 50,000, deployed around the world on the territories of the nuclear-weapon States and some non-nuclear-weapon States, as well as on the high seas.

Governmental experts, in a United Nations study* carried out over the past two years, found that the quantitative growth of the nuclear-weapon arsenals has been stopped and the total number of nuclear warheads in the world is now slowly declining. However, the qualitative improvement of nuclear-weapon systems continues in several areas.

The testing of nuclear warheads is generally considered to be a critical element in the process of development of nuclear weapons. All five nuclear-weapon States conduct nuclear tests as part of their weapons programmes. It has been reported that between 1945 and 1989 there were 1,819 internationally recorded tests, an average of one test every nine days.**

EARLY EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A TEST BAN

International efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon test ban began in the early 1950s. The unprecedented scale of destructiveness of the two bombs that exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and the hazardous radioactive fall-out from tests, particularly atmospheric tests, caused mounting concern throughout the world. Early in 1954, India proposed a "standstill agreement" which would seek to end nuclear test explosions as a step which later might lead to the discontinuance of the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, which was set up in 1955, concluded that the only way to prevent the danger of hazardous radioactive fall-out was to ban all nuclear-test explosions.

By the end of 1956, the different approaches of States to the issue of a test ban became clear: the Soviet Union and India were calling for an early and separate agreement on a ban on all nuclear tests without international verification, maintaining that no significant testing could go undetected; Yugoslavia, voicing the view of an emerging group of non-aligned States, urged an agreement with such control as might prove necessary; and the Western Powers regarded the limitation and eventual ban of nuclear testing, with adequate verification, as part of a comprehensive disarmament process.

Following an exchange of letters between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1958, it was decided that a conference of experts from eight countries (Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States) be convened to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. The Conference of Experts met in Geneva in July/August 1958 and submitted a unanimous report in which they concluded that it was technically feasible, within limits, to establish a workable and effective control system that could detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low-yield explosions of from 1 to 5 kilotons.

Subsequently, in October 1958, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States began negotiations in Geneva in an effort to reach agreement on a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests on the basis of the experts' report. France stated that it would

---

* Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary-General, A/45/373.

** *Ibid.*, p. 62.

not sign a test-ban treaty unless the treaty were accompanied by other measures of disarmament.

The three Powers agreed to a voluntary suspension of nuclear tests when the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests began in October 1958, and maintained that voluntary ban for about three years. In 1960, France conducted its first nuclear explosion. The Soviet Union resumed nuclear tests in the atmosphere on 1 September 1961. The United States resumed underground testing on 15 September that same year.

Early in the Conference, verification became the main issue of the negotiations. The Conference made considerable progress on that question in 1959 and 1960, drawing up the broad outlines of a control organization, although significant differences remained unresolved, particularly with regard to the number of on-site inspections.

Overall East-West relations, however, significantly deteriorated in 1961 and the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests became deadlocked and finally adjourned in January 1962. Endeavours at the United Nations and elsewhere that year to break the deadlock were unsuccessful. Thus ended what had appeared to be a hopeful and encouraging effort to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Nevertheless, the momentum that had been built concerning the issue of a nuclear-test ban did not entirely dissipate. During 1963, private talks were held between the USSR and the United States on a test ban and, on 10 June, it was announced that the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed to hold talks in mid-July on the cessation of nuclear tests. On 2 July, the Soviet Union stated that the insistence of the United States and the United Kingdom on on-site inspections made a comprehensive nuclear-test ban impossible. The USSR was nevertheless prepared to sign a limited treaty banning tests in three environments, that is, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. It also withdrew its previous demand that a partial test ban be accompanied by a moratorium on underground testing.

TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

The trilateral negotiations began in Moscow on 15 July 1963 and ended on 25 July when the text of the treaty was initialled. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, whose implementation is based on national means of verification, was signed on 5 August by the Foreign Ministers of the three countries and was opened for signature in the three capitals. The Treaty entered into force on 10 October 1963. By 1 November 1990, there were 117 parties to the Treaty. Two nuclear-weapon States, China and France, are among those that have not acceded to it.

In the preamble to the Treaty the parties commit themselves to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, to continue negotiations for that purpose and to put an end to the contamination of the human environment by radioactive substances.

The Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions—for weapons testing or any other purpose—in the atmosphere or beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or in any other environment if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the States under whose jurisdiction or control the explosions are conducted. Furthermore, the parties undertake to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon test explosions, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the three environments or have the effects referred to above.

Since 1963, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have conducted their testing only at underground sites. France

READEX FICHE

continued to carry out atmospheric tests until 1974, when it changed to underground testing. China ended atmospheric testing in 1980.

The PTBT was the first international agreement of world-wide scope reached in the field of nuclear arms limitation. It was hailed as an event of great significance that would begin to curb the nuclear arms race. In practical terms it has greatly contributed to the elimination of radioactive pollution. It has also helped to bring about some relaxation of international tension and to create a climate facilitating negotiations on other agreements relating to nuclear arms limitation.

FURTHER EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

In the decades following the signing of the PTBT, discussions—and sometimes negotiations—on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) have been held in various forums: in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and its successor bodies for multilateral disarmament negotiations (today known as the Conference on Disarmament); at the trilateral negotiations from 1977 to 1980 between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom; at the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States; and at the General Assembly of the United Nations and its three special sessions devoted to disarmament.

In 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the bilateral Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, commonly referred to as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), which prohibits, *inter alia*, all nuclear-weapon tests with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. Because its provisions did not extend to underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, both States worked out and, in 1976, signed the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, referred to as the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), which puts a 150-kiloton limit on such explosions. Difficulties arose in connection with verification procedures for both Treaties and, therefore, neither Treaty was ratified at that time.

From 1977 to 1980, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States held tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban without being able to reach a final agreement. During this period, the Conference on Disarmament—the multilateral disarmament negotiating body—was periodically informed on the progress of these negotiations.

In 1982 and 1983, the Conference on Disarmament set up an *ad hoc* working group with a limited mandate to "discuss and define" issues relating to verification and compliance, but not actually to negotiate a treaty. No tangible progress was made, however, and disagreement over the scope of the mandate prevented the re-establishment of this subsidiary body for the next several years.

In 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a step-by-step approach to the objective of the ultimate cessation of all testing and in that context initiated negotiations on improved verification procedures for the TTBT and the PNET. Following the successful conclusion of those negotiations, during the Washington summit meeting in May/June 1990, the Soviet Union and the United States signed verification protocols for both Treaties which have paved the way for their ratification by the respective legislative bodies of the two countries.

In July 1990, the Conference on Disarmament was able to agree on the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with a task, *inter alia*, to initiate substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance.

A number of States have taken the position that the step-by-step approach agreed on by the United States and the Soviet Union is insufficient because it does not specify when a comprehensive ban is to be achieved. They continue to call for an immediate ban on all testing. At the initiative of these States, the United Nations

General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions which attached the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. These resolutions have been adopted by majority votes. The Conference on Disarmament has been requested by the Assembly in successive years to begin negotiations on such a treaty. Some States have submitted texts of draft treaties and various proposals and other initiatives related to a comprehensive test ban to the Conference on Disarmament, but no multilateral negotiations on a CTB have been initiated. Most nuclear-weapon States assess nuclear testing as essential for the credibility, reliability and survivability of their nuclear deterrent forces.

The verification aspects of a comprehensive test ban have always received considerable attention. A variety of means, including satellite and radiation monitoring, have allowed the verification of adherence to the ban on atmospheric tests. Underground testing has traditionally been monitored using seismic techniques, although other complementary techniques have been devised. Currently, efforts are being made in the Conference on Disarmament to design a global seismic network for the recording and exchange of data.

The United Nations General Assembly has discussed the issue of a CTB basically under two related agenda items: "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions" and "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". At the forty-fourth session, however, an additional item concerning a CTB was included: "Amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water". In 1989, the resolution under this item was adopted by a vote of 127 in favour to two against, with 22 abstaining. In 1990, the General Assembly adopted the relevant resolution by a vote of 116 in favour to two against, with 28 abstaining.

TOWARDS THE PTBT AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

The question of an amendment to the PTBT that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was first discussed in conjunction with the question of the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions at the fortieth session of the General Assembly in 1985. In 1988, the concept was formalized by the submission of identical letters addressed to the three depositary Governments of the Treaty and signed by the Foreign Minister of Venezuela and the representatives of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.

Article II of the PTBT stipulates that its depositary Governments—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States—must convene a conference to discuss an amendment if at least one third of the States parties request it. According to the provisions of the Treaty, an amendment becomes binding on all States parties if supported by a majority of the parties, including the three depositaries. The General Assembly adopted a resolution, in 1988, supporting such a request. By early 1989, the required number of parties calling for the convening of an amendment conference was reached.

At the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1989, the United Kingdom, on behalf of the three depositaries, announced that, in accordance with article II of the Treaty, they had arranged to convene a Conference to consider the amendment to the Treaty proposed by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. The General Assembly recommended that a preparatory committee, open to all parties to the Treaty, should be established to make arrangements for the Amendment Conference and that such a committee should meet at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 1 June 1990, followed by a one-week session of the Conference from 4 to 8 June 1990 and a second substantive session from 7 to 18 January 1991. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and provide such services as might be required for the Amendment Conference and its preparation.

Thereafter, six meetings of the States parties to the Treaty and fifteen open-ended informal consultations took place between 12 January and

25 May 1990. At their meeting on 8 March, the States parties decided to hold the Amendment Conference in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991, preceded by the Meeting for the Organization of the Conference. The Meeting, in which 74 States parties to the PTBT participated, took place at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 8 June 1990. Under the presidency of Ambassador Edmond Jayasinghe of Sri Lanka, the Meeting adopted the provisional agenda of the Amendment Conference and the draft rules of procedure and agreed on the financial arrangements relating to the costs of the Conference. It also requested the UN Secretariat to prepare for the Conference a brief background document.

Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information
DPI/1103—December 1990—3M

1

INFORMATION KIT
FACT SHEET 1

PARTIAL TEST-BAN TREATY—AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER*

1. Opening statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Election of the President.
3. Final report of the Meeting for the Organization of the Amendment Conference.
4. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference.
5. Adoption of the Agenda.
6. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
7. Credentials of representatives to the Conference:
   a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
   b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
8. Election of other officers.
9. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.
10. Programme of Work.

---

* PTBT/CONF/M/10

11. General Debate.

12. Consideration of the Proposed Amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water as provided for in its article II, including reports of the Committees.

13. Other matters.

14. Adoption of final document/report of the Conference.

15. Closure of the Conference.

Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information
DPI/1103—December 1990—3M

2

INFORMATION KIT
FACT SHEET 2

PARTIAL TEST-BAN TREATY—AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

Below is the text of an amendment proposal to be considered at the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. The proposal was submitted by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

AMENDMENT PROPOSAL*

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water shall be amended by the addition of the following article and protocols:

ARTICLE VI

Protocols annexed to this Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty.

PROTOCOL I

States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, in order to achieve the permanent banning of all nuclear explosions, including all such explosions underground, have agreed that in addition to their undertakings in Article I of such Treaty:

1. Each of the Parties of this Protocol undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction and control;

a) Underground; or

b) In any other environment not described in article I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

2. Each of the Parties to this Protocol undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described in paragraph 1 of this Protocol.

* PTBT/CONF/M/3

PROTOCOL II

(The precise provisions of this protocol are not included at this time, but will be submitted later for consideration and agreement at the conference. They will deal with all questions of verification, including in particular, the following:

- international co-operation for seismic and atmospheric data acquisition and analysis,
- installation of special seismic detection networks on the territory of the nuclear weapons States Parties to the Treaty,
- non-interference with national technical means of verification and non-use of concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means,
- on-site inspections, and
- a permanent consultative mechanism to consider questions of compliance and ambiguous situations.)

Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information
DPI/1103—December 1990—3M

3

INFORMATION KIT
FACT SHEET 3

PARTIAL TEST-BAN TREATY—AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was signed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on 5 August 1963 at Moscow and entered into force on 10 October of that year. As at 1 November 1990, there were 117 parties to the PTBT. Below is the text of the Treaty.

TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER*

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties",

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

a) In the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

b) In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose

* United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964.

jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE II

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties.

ARTICLE III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the Original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

13

It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

ARTICLE V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

For the Government of the United States of America:

Dean Rusk

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Home

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

A. Gromyko

ANNEX

LIST OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER (AS AT 1 NOVEMBER 1990)

Afghanistan
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bangladesh
Belgium
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Byelorussian SSR
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Côte d'Ivoire
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Fiji
Finland
Gabon
Gambia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Lebanon
Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

16

Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Republic of Korea
Romania
Rwanda
Samoa
San Marino
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukrainian SSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United Republic of Tanzania
United States of America
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yemen, Republic of
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia

Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information
DPI/1103—December 1990—3M